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No single human could bring to 
the forefront in education the in-
fluence that James Coleman's 
critics believe he possesses. 
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In the last few years many articles have been written 
criticizing James Coleman, author of the Coleman 
Report's One and Two. Some critics have tried to point out 
that his research Is less than scholarly. Others have ac· 
cused Coleman of failing to recognize the difference bet· 
ween his scientific findings and his personal beliefs. All of 
these efforts have accomplished more for Coleman's 
image as a significant policy maker than anything else. In 
reality no single human cou ld bring to the forefront the in· 
fluence that many of his critics beli eve he possesses. 
In one incident, for example, Coleman was criticized 
as the scholar who influenced President Richard Nixon of 
radically changing the federal government's school in· 
tegration policies. According to Biloine Young and Grace 
Bress in their article "Coleman's Retreat and the Politics 
of GOOd Intentions", Coleman was a "significant par· 
ticipant" in the Nixon decision to transfer school in· 
tegratioo efforts to the Jurisdiction of the fedetat courts.• A 
close investigation of these events reveals that contrary to 
popular bel ief Coleman actually had very little to do with 
this decision. Even before Coleman arrived in Washington 
as an aid to Nixon, the administration was well on their 
way of shifting this responsibility to the courts. 
Desperately Coleman challenged this action, even going 
beyond his own research capabllltl es to predict that in-
tegration does promote achievement. 
Initially Nixon intended to use some of Coleman's 
studies as a rationale for federal educatio nal aid cuts. The 
Westinghouse Study and tHe 1966 Equality of Educational 
Opportunity Report were specifically used to point out 
that quality equipment did not make a significant dif· 
ference In achievement scores, thus federal funds could 
be more adroitly used elsewhere-Vietnam. However, 
since public schooling was a popular home town 
congressional program. ultimately Nixon signed a bill that 
increased educational aid rather than reducing it.• 
Keeping in mind his Southern Strategy, Nixon con· 
tinued to attempt to walk the tine between the con-
servatives and the liberals. He appeared to be probing in 
various directions, attempting to establis h a sound in· 
tegration policy, acceptable to all. At one point, he asked 
Health, Education and Welfar e (HEW) Secretary Rlchar<I 
son to submit an amendment to an educatio nal finance 
bill, forbidding the use of federal dollars to support 
bussing, Richardson. disgruntled, threatened to resign. 
After a meeting, the President withdrew his proposal, and 
Richardson remained with the administration.• New York 
Times W(lter, Fred Hechinger, noted In 1970, " Education 
was caught between white segregationists, black power 
and sheer difficulty. Integration was not dead but it ap· 
peared at least to be in limbo."• 
Apparently the term "quality schools" was 
something everyone could agree was significant. Despite 
the fact that integration had procee<led to the point that 
the South was more totally integrated than the North, 
Nixon did not dwell on this fact. Coleman believed that 
quality schools meant integrated schOols and challenged 
the Administration to move torward on this issue. Within 
this context Coleman made his famous statement "in· 
tegratlon alone would reduce the existing achievement 
gap between biacks and whites as much as 30 per cent." 
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Yet this announcement was not a plea for total Integration 
as much as It was a call for assistance in developing 
educational alt ernat ives . "Th e nation's school 
authorities," said Coleman, "seem too transfixed with one 
technique of integration when there is a variety of ways to 
make it work ... federal aid is needed to develop possibly 
the voucher plan and after-school facilities to attract all 
types of people."' A New York Times interpretation of this 
statement pointed out that Coleman was in tact 
suggesting that Integration could be achieved In a number 
of ways, such as integrated trips to mus.eums and to 
laboratories where individuals would learn in a variety of 
environments.• 
Coleman often cited the fact that Americans lived in 
an information rich society, where education could be 
taught by volunteer tutors, by store-front schools, by l~rge 
corporations. television, radio, newspapers, magazines 
and books, through the use o f vouchers.' Ultimately, he 
noted integration was not a question of increasing 
achievement 30 per cent or any other per cent, but 
basically a ques1ion of morality. " Are we willing," he 
asked, "to let schools be the vehicle through which the 
society separates individuals Into two parts, separate and 
unequal?''• 
During his Washington tenure, Coleman ac ted as an 
advisor on the Federal Emergency School Aid Act, which 
was designed to assist schools undergoing court-ordere<l 
desegregation. His recommendations were large in the 
area of providing finances for interracial experiences out· 
side the publ ic school system through the util ization of 
private agencies and other educational enterprises.• 
Eventual ly the Admini stration decided lhat the en· 
forcement of school desegregation efforts should be 
limited to de jure components only. Since Coleman 
believe<l that de facto and de jure segregation could not 
be distinguishe<l except supposedly one takes place in 
the North and the other in the South, he thought that these 
proposed polic ies were too l imited and accused some of 
the federal administrators of being " neosegre· 
gationists.'' 10 
Earlier In February 1970, Senator John Sten~is 
pointed out this same discrepancy and attempted to in-
troduce an amendment which would require the govern· 
ment to cut funds where Northern de facto segregation 
existed. In April, however, that specific education bill was 
passed withou t the Stennis proposal." 
By the summer of 1970 the Nixon Adminis tration was 
backing away from the orig lnal Johnson school _on. 
tegration commitment. The Civol Rights Comm1ss1on 
score<l the Adminstration for Its retreat. Kenneth Cfarl<, 
New Yori< University professor, blamed Nixon for 
defaulting on school integration leadership." Coleman, 
before Walt er Mondale's Senate Select Committee on 
Equal Educational Integration, again discussed .. the 
academic benefits of integration. Through such policies, 
the achievement gap between the two races could be 
narrowed as much as "25 per cent," he stated. Yet as an 
appendage to this announcement, he conUnued to ad· 
vocate educational flexibility by supporting such ex· 
periments as the Parkway School Program of 
Philadelphia." 
Eventually, the Administration found a new Individual 
to rally their forces. He was Alexan.der Bicket, a Yale 
professor whO claime<l that complete integration was om· 
possible and called the Coleman Report nothing more 
6 
than an ambiguous slatement." Bickel, a staunch sup· 
porter of neighborhood schools, was In; and Coleman, al· 
tor six months, was out. 
Was Coleman's influence the primary factor in the 
Administration's policy change? Did Coleman, as some 
have charged, have a monopoly on. governmental 
thinking? Even before Coleman's arrival on Washington, 
the Nixon Administration had decided to change its 
policy. In the fall of 1969, the Administration announced 
that It would renegotiate with one hundred school dos· 
tric ts who had received federal school aid cuts, due to 
segregation policies." Leon E. Panetta, testifying In 
March 1970, state<l that the HEW retreat was attributed to 
Senator John Stennis' concern for Mississippi's in· 
tegration policies. According to Panetta, Stennis 
treatened to withdraw as Senate floor leadership of the 
Presi dent's embattled Safeguard Antlballistlc Ml ss!le 
System if the Administration persisted in promoting on· 
leg ration at all costs. "The retreat," said Panetta, " was a 
political choice aimed at appeasing the South." He note<l 
that neither Bob Haldeman nor John Ehrlichman was 
aiding the integration effort, thereby leaving Robert Finch 
the sole defender." While the President and his staff had 
access to Coleman, he was hardly a significant advisor. At 
the time that Coleman was suppose dly advising the Ad· 
ministration to switch to court enforcement, Bickel was 
writing Nixon's educational policy statements. According 
to Syracuse University Professor Gerald Grant, the 
President's March 26, 1970, educational statement reflec· 
ted the differences of expert advice with Coleman on one 
side of the issue and Bickel on the other." In trying to 
assess the role that individuals played in this important 
policy change, George Wallace was probably a more 
significant advisor than either Coleman or Bic kel. After 
winning a 1970 Alabama Governor's election. Wallace 
predicted that there would be a dramatic change in the Ad· 
ministration 's Integration pol icies. Approximately 28 days 
later, Finch resigned. 
Earlier In that year, Leon Panetta, Director of the Civil 
Rights Enforcement Division, had resigned. By the end of 
1970, U.S. Commissioner of Education, James ;Allen was 
on his way. This action made it a clean sweep; Nixon had a 
completely new staff. Ellio t Richardson became HEW 
Secretary, Sidney Marland, who en.dorsed moderate 
bussing became the new Commissioner of Education and 
J . Stanl
0
ey Pottinger assumed Panetta's position. The 
newest desegregation policy was announced in August, 
1970, by Attorney General John Mitchell." In essence the 
Administration decide<l to rely on court action to enforce 
Integration. ' 'This wilt consist," state<l Mitchell, "'of filing 
and arguing lawsuits based upon the jurisdiction of the 
Fourteenth Amendment."" No longer would the federal 
government send marshalls to the South or anywhere 
else. 
It was the untimely fate of the school integration el· 
fort to fall upon the eve of a foreign war which sh~ this 
nation to its very foundations. Many with educational 
foresight and dedication were forced to retreat, propelling 
Into the White House an individual whose record lacked 
the same quality of commitment. From the beginning 
Nixon had written o ff the civi l rights vote. With most o f the 
big Northern states controlling their 1968 delegates, 
Nixon was forced to go South where Republicans were not 
restraine<l. Here was the birth of the Southern Strategy, 
conceived in necessity but gradually assuming the spec· 
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tacle of a grand design. Under the gu idance of Mitchell, 
this political strategy decreed that anything the South 
might perceive as faintly hostile was forbidden. 
Ultimately, desegregation enforcement programs 
were deemphasized and shifted out of the governmental 
domain and Into the courts. The pivotal personnel ele· 
ments in this action were the Senators from Mississippi 
and South Carolina, John Stennis and Strom Thurmond, 
and Governor George Wal lace, who app lied the pressure, 
gently at first, hoping to suspend HEW desegregation 
guidelines authOrized by the 1964 Civil Rights Act." 
Avowing that he favored freedom of choice plans, Nixon 
set to work changing his s taff, realigning educational 
po
licy 
and in general s lowing the momentum of the 
desegregation effort. Those who advocated the old John· 
son pol ic ies were eventually overwhelmed and retreated 
to the sideli nes. And in the overall analys is, Co leman was 
not a signig icant participant but simply one small voice in 
a time o f overwhelming po litical change. 
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